Decision making relies on adequately evaluating the consequences of actions on the basis of past experience and the current physiological state. A key role in this process is played by the basal ganglia, where neural activity and plasticity are modulated by dopaminergic input from the midbrain. Internal physiological factors, such as hunger, scale signals encoded by dopaminergic neurons and thus they alter the motivation for taking actions and learning. However, to our knowledge, no formal mathematical formulation exists for how a physiological state affects learning and action selection in the basal ganglia. We developed a framework for modelling the effect of motivation on choice and learning. The framework defines the motivation to obtain a particular resource as the difference between the desired and the current level of this resource, and proposes how the utility of reinforcements depends on the motivation. To account for dopaminergic activity previously recorded at different physiological states, the paper argues that the prediction error encoded in the dopaminergic activity needs to be redefined as the difference between utility and expected utility, which depends on both the objective reinforcement and the motivation. We also demonstrate a possible mechanism by which the evaluation and learning of utility of actions can be implemented in the basal ganglia network. The presented theory brings together models of learning in the basal ganglia with the incentive salience theory in a single simple framework, and it provides a mechanistic insight into how decision processes and learning in the basal ganglia are modulated by the motivation. Moreover, this theory is also consistent with data on neural underpinnings of overeating and obesity, and makes further experimental predictions.
Another important line of work describing subjective preferences is the utility theory. 48 It is based on the assumption that people can consistently rank their choices depending 49 upon their preferences. The utility theory has been used extensively in economics [29] , 50 and it has been shown that dopaminergic responses depend on the subjective utility of 51 the obtained reward magnitude, rather than its objective magnitude [30] . As described 52 above, there is a need to extend the general utility function with a motivational 53 component that describes the bias in the evaluation of positive and negative 54 consequences of decisions as a result of changes in the physiological state of a subject. 55 Evidence for this bias comes from devaluation studies in which reinforcements are 56 specifically devalued by pre-feeding or taste aversion. The concept of state-dependent 57 valuation has been studied in various contexts [24, 31, 32] and in different species, 58 including starlings [33, 34] , locusts [35] and fish [27] . These studies suggest that the 59 utility of outcomes depends on both the (learned) reinforcement value and the 60 physiological state. One of the earliest attempts to capture this relationship between 61 incentive value and internal motivational state is the incentive salience theory [12] . 62 In this paper we aim to provide an explanation for the above effects of physiological 63 state on behaviour and dopaminergic activity with a simple framework that combines 64 incentive learning theory [36, 37] with models of learning in the basal ganglia. By 65 integrating key concepts from these theories we define a utility function for actions that 66 can be modulated by internal and external factors. In our framework, the utility is 67 defined as the change in the desirability of physiological state resulting from taking an 68 action and obtaining a reinforcement. Following previous theoretic work [28] , the 69 motivation for a particular resource is defined as the difference between the desired and 70 the current level of this resource. 71 In the proposed framework, motivation affects both teaching and activation signals 72 encoded by dopaminergic neurons. Relying on experimental data, we argue that the 73 dopaminergic teaching signal encodes the difference between utility and expected utility, 74 which depends on motivation. Moreover, we propose how motivation can influence the 75 dopaminergic activation signal to appropriately drive action selection behaviour. We 76 also highlight that the resulting consequences of an action can be positive or negative 77 depending on how far the current and new physiological state are from the desired state. 78 Building on existing theories we illustrate how the neurons in the striatum could learn 79 these consequences through plasticity rules. Finally, we use the resulting models to 80 explain experimental data. Together, this paper discusses a modelling framework that 81 describes how the internal physiological state affects learning and action selection in the 82 basal ganglia and provides novel interpretations of existing experimental data. To 83 provide a rationale for our framework the remainder of the introduction reviews the 84 data on effects of physiological state on dopaminergic teaching signal. 85 Effects of motivation on dopaminergic responses 86 to reflect the expected future reinforcement, whereas the response to the unconditioned 93 stimulus (US) represents the difference between the obtained reinforcement and the 94 expectation [1] . To account for these responses, the reward prediction error in a 95 temporal difference model (δ T D ) is classically defined as [1] :
The above equation defines the prediction error as the difference between total 97 reinforcement (including both reinforcement actually received r t and reinforcement 98 expected in the future V t+1 ) and the expected reinforcement (V t ). 99 We now review how the above equation captures the dopamine responses at the time 100 of the CS and the US, which change over the course of learning. At the start of learning, 101 the animal has not formed any expectation yet, which means that at the time of the CS, 102 V t is 0. Given that no reinforcement is provided at the time of CS presentation, r t is 103 also 0. Thus, the prediction error at the time of the CS is equal to the expected value of 104 the reinforcement (δ T D = V t+1 ). The response to the CS is zero in naive animals. By 105 contrast, the response to the CS in fully trained animals reflects the expected upcoming 106 reinforcement, as extensive training allowed animals to update their expectations to 107 predict upcoming reinforcements better. At the time of the US, no future 108 reinforcements are expected so V t+1 is 0, thus the reward prediction error at the time of 109 US is equal to δ T D = r t − V t . Unpredicted rewards (i.e. positive reinforcements) evoke 110 positive prediction errors, while predicted reinforcements do not. Thus this definition of 111 prediction error captures observed patterns of dopaminergic responses; where naive Normative theory of state-dependent utility 137 The utility and consequences of actions are dependent on the usefulness of the 138 reinforcement (r) with respect to the current state. To maintain a physiological balance 139 the distance between the current state S and the desired state S * has to be minimised. 140 We assume that the desirability function of a physiological state has a concave, 141 quadratic shape (Fig 2A) , because it is more important to act when you are in a very 142 low physiological state, compared to when in a near optimal state. Thus, we define a 143 desirability of a state in the following way (a constant of 1/2 is added for mathematical 144 convenience, as it will cancel in subsequent derivations):
We define the utility U of an action as a change in desirability of the physiological 146 state resulting from taking that action. Fig. 2A illustrates that the utility of an action 147 depends on both the obtained reinforcement r for that action and the motivation m, 148 which is defined as the difference between the desired and the current physiological 149 state:
According to the above definition, the same reinforcement could yield a positive or 151 negative utility of an action, depending on whether the difference between the current 152 physiological state and the desired state is positive or negative ( Fig. 2A ). This parallels 153 an observation that nutrients such as salt may be appetitive or aversive depending on 154 the level of an animal's reserves [26] . Although not discussed in this paper, please note 155 that this definition of the utility also can be extended to the utility of an external state, 156 such as a particular location in space. The utility of such an external state can be Before presenting an exact expression, it is useful to consider a simple approximate 159 expression for the utility. Such approximation can be obtained through a first order 160 Taylor expansion of Eq. (2):
= mr.
This approximation of the utility clearly shows that the utility of an action, defined 162 as the change in physiological state, depends on both the motivation m and the 163 reinforcement r, where r = S2 − S1. Dependence of utility of an action on the reinforcement and physiological state. A) Same reinforcement may have positive or negative utility depending on the physiological state. B) A large reinforcement may have no utility even if the animal is initially in a depleted state. U = utility, m = motivation. S* = the desired state and S1 = state before action, S2 = state after action. Arrow length indicates the size of the reinforcement (r). Changes in state resulting in increase and decrease of desirability are indicated with green and red arrows, respectively.
In order to select actions on the basis of their utility, animals needs to maintain an 165 estimate of the utilityÛ of an action. There are several ways such an estimate can be 166 learned. Here we discuss a particular learning algorithm, which results in prediction 167 errors that resemble those observed by Cone et al. [25] . This learning algorithm assumes 168 that animals minimise the absolute error in the prediction of the utility of the chosen 169 action. We can therefore define this prediction error as:
The above expression for the prediction error (Eq. (6)) provides a general definition 171 of the prediction error as the difference between the observed and expected utility. In 172 this paper we claim that this expression better describes the dopaminergic teaching 173 signal observed in experimental data, which we will demonstrate in more detail in the 174 next section.
175
Assuming that the animal's estimate of expected reinforcement is encoded in a 176 parameter V , the animal's estimate of the utility isÛ = mV . Combining Eq. (5) with 177 Eq. (6), we obtain the following expression for the reward prediction error:
To predict upcoming reinforcement better, the absolute prediction error has to be 179 minimised. We can define an objective function that will be maximised:
In order to maximise this objective function, the estimate of the expected 181 reinforcement, V , is updated proportionally to the prediction error:
Simulating state-dependent dopaminergic responses 183 This section serves to illustrate that the pattern of dopaminergic activity seen in the 184 study by Cone et al. [25] is not consistent with the classical theory and can be better 185 explained with a state-dependent utility as described above. We first simulated the 186 classical model in which reward prediction error is described in Eq. (1). In the 187 simulation, the CS was presented at time step 1, while the US was presented at time Fig 3A) . An estimate of the expected value of the reinforcement is reflected 200 by a response to the CS and the response to the US is close to zero as the reinforcement 201 received is fully predicted. The simulations employing the state-dependent prediction error (Eq. (7)) as defined 203 in the previous section followed the same protocol as in the classical case. During 204 training, at the time of US the reinforcement estimate was updated proportionally to 205 the prediction error, ∆V = αδ. This update is similar to that in Eq. (9), but for 206 simplicity was not scaled by m. Adding this scaling factor does not qualitatively change 207 the resulting pattern of the prediction error as m was a positive constant in all the 208 simulations.
209
During testing, the values were no longer modified, and the dopaminergic teaching 210 signal at the time of the US was computed from Eq. (7) , while the value at the time of 211 the CS was taken as mV . The parameter describing motivation was set to m = 0.2 for a 212 state close to balanced and m = 2 for a depleted state. 213 In simulated animals that are trained in the near-balanced state little learning is 214 triggered and the response to the CS is close to zero ( Fig 3B) . However, when these 215 simulated animals are then tested in the depleted state, the scaled utility is greater than 216 zero and consequently evokes a positive reward prediction error. In contrast, simulated 217 animals trained in the depleted state learn the estimate of the expected value of the 218 reinforcement. There is an increase in the dopaminergic teaching signal in these 219 simulated animals at the time of the CS since the expected value is transferred to the 220 CS. When these simulated animals are tested in the near-balanced state, with a 221 motivation close to zero, a very small reward prediction error is evoked, because both 222 the reinforcement and expected value are scaled by a number close to zero.
223
In line with the theory in the previous section in which we formally defined both the 224 utility and motivation, the above simulations shows that in order to account for the 225 experimental data by Cone et al., (2016) , the prediction error needs to be redefined as a 226 difference between the utility of a reinforcement and the expected utility of that 227 reinforcement, which depends on both the objective reinforcement magnitude and the greater than the distance to the optimum. In the example in Fig 2B, if we use a linear 234 approximation with a positive motivation, the utility is approximated as greater than 235 zero, even though the actual utility is not as this action will exceed the desired state. 236 Eq. (4) also suggests that any action with r > 0 will have positive utility if m > 0, 237 regardless of possible negative consequences (i.e. reaching a new state further away from 238 the desired state). Moreover, if the distance of the current state to the desired state is 239 equal to the distance of the new state to the desired state, the utility of an action would 240 be zero ( Fig. 2B ). Using Eq. (4) it is impossible to capture these effects and account for 241 both positive and negative consequences of this action.
242
One classical example in which the utility of an action switches sign depending on 243 the proximity to the desired physiological state is salt appetite. When animals are 244 depleted of sodium, salt consumption is rewarding. However, when animals are 245 physiologically balanced, salt consumption is extremely aversive [26] . To avoid using 246 multiple equations to explain the switch from positive to negative utilities and vice 247 versa [37] , we need to formulate an equation that can account for negative consequences 248 of actions when the m ≈ 0 or m < 0 and is able to account for positive consequences 249 when the motivation changes, i.e. m > 0.
250
Therefore we use a second order Taylor expansion which gives an exact expression 251 for the utility:
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In the above equation mr could be seen as the positive and r 2 /2 as the negative 253 consequences of the action, respectively. The first term plays a greater role when 254 deprived and promotes taking actions, whereas the second term plays a greater role 255 when balanced and discouraged taking actions.
256
During action selection it is imperative to choose actions to maximise future utility. 257 For competing actions, the utility of all available actions needs to be computed. The 258 action with the highest utility is most beneficial to select, but this action should only 259 chosen when its utility is positive. If the utility of all actions is negative, no actions 260 should be taken. From a fitness point of view, not making an action is more 261 advantageous than incurring a high cost.
262
In the next section we will elaborate on how Eq. (10) can be evaluated in the basal 263 ganglia and provide an example of a biologically plausible implementation. For 264 simplicity we will only consider a single physiological dimension (e.g. nutrient reserve), 265 but we recognise that the theory needs to be extended in the future to multiple 266 dimensions (e.g. water reserve, fatigue) which an animal needs to optimise.
267
Furthermore, taking an action aimed to restore one dimension (e.g. nutrient reserve) 268 may also include negative consequences that are independent of the considered 269 dimension (e.g. fatigue). We will elaborate on these issues in the Discussion.
270

Neural implementation 271
In the previous sections we discussed how the utility of actions or stimuli change in a 272 state-dependent manner. In this section we will focus on the neural implementation of 273 these concepts. More specifically, we will address how the utility of previously chosen 274 actions can be computed in the basal ganglia and how this circuit could learn the utility 275 of actions.
276
Evaluation of utility in the basal ganglia circuit 277
The basal ganglia is a group of subcortical nuclei that play a key role in action selection 278 and reinforcement learning. It is organised into two main pathways shown schematically 279 in Fig 4. The Go or direct pathway is associated with the initiation of movements, while 280 the Nogo or indirect pathway is associated with the inhibition of movements [38] . These 281 two pathways include two separate populations of striatal neurons expressing different 282 dopaminergic receptors [39] . The striatal Go neurons mainly express D1 receptors which 283 are excited by dopamine, while the striatal Nogo neurons mainly express D2 receptors 284 which are inhibited by dopamine [40] . Thus, dopaminergic activation signal controls the 285 competition between these two pathways during action selection and promotes action 286 initiation over inhibition.
287
Given the architecture of the basal ganglia, we hypothesise that this circuitry is well 288 suited for the computation of the utility of actions in decision making. This utility 289 could be encoded at the final processing stage of this network, i.e. the thalamus. In 290 particular, we suggest that the Go neurons will mostly determine thalamic activity 291 when the utility is positive, while, the Nogo neurons when the utility is negative, and 292 the dopaminergic activation signal can appropriately control the relative influence of Go 293 and Nogo neurons, because it encodes motivation. There are various ways to describe 294 how the utility is represented in the basal ganglia and how the basal ganglia output can 295 drive action selection. In this paper, we show one possibility that should only be treated 296 as a proof of principle.
297
In line with earlier studies, we assume that synaptic strengths of Go and Nogo 298 neurons encode positive and negative consequences of actions, respectively [41] [42] [43] . for the two terms in Eq. (10), namely, Go neurons produce activity proportional to mr 301 while Nogo neurons produce activity proportional to r 2 /2.
302
We refer to the output of the basal ganglia as the thalamic activity, denoted by T . T 303 depends on the cortico-striatal weights of Go neurons (G) and Nogo neurons (N ), and 304 the dopaminergic activation signal denoted by D. The striatal weights of Go neurons 305 have an overall positive effect on the thalamic activity as the projection from the Go 306 neurons to the thalamus involves a double inhibitory connection. In contrast, the 307 inhibitory effect of Nogo neurons on the thalamic activity result in a negative 308 contribution to the thalamic activity. We assume that the dopaminergic activation 309 signal increases the gain of Go neurons, based on the observation of an increased slope 310 of firing-input relationship of neurons expressing D1 receptors in the presence of 311 dopamine [18] . In contrast, we assume that the dopaminergic activation signal reduces 312 the gain of Nogo neurons, as their firing-input relationship has decreased slope in the 313 presence of dopamine [19] . 314 Although admittedly more complex, we can capture the signs of the influences of the 315 dopaminergic activation signal, Go and Nogo neurons in a linear approximation [43] :
In the above equation, the contribution of Go neurons to the thalamic activity is 317 described by the first term DG, reflecting facilitatory effect of dopamine on Go neurons. 318 The inhibitory connection of Nogo neurons to the thalamic activity results in a negative 319 contribution to the thalamic activity and is described by the second term −(1 − D)N . 320 We assume that D ∈ [0, 1], meaning that a value of D = 0.5 corresponds to a baseline 321 level of dopaminergic activation signal for which both striatal populations equally 322 contribute to the thalamic activity. 323 We now show that the thalamic activity defined in Eq. and N = r 2 /2). Then, we can rewrite Eq. (11) as:
Comparing this to Eq. (10), we observe that the thalamic activity is proportional to 328 the utility (T = (1 − D)U ) when the motivation is encoded by dopaminergic activation 329 signal:
We can rewrite Eq. (13) in the following way to express the level of dopamine for a 331 given motivation:
In summary, when the striatal weights encode the positive and negative 333 consequences and the dopaminergic activation signal is described by Eq. (14), then the 334 thalamic activity is proportional to the utility.
335
Let us now consider how this utility can be used to guide action selection.
336
Computational models of action selection typically assume that all basal ganglia nuclei 337 and thalamus include neurons selective for different actions [44] . Therefore, the activity 338 of thalamic neurons selective for specific actions can be determined on the basis of their 339 individual positive and negative consequences and the common dopaminergic activation 340 signal. Given that the proportionality coefficient (1 − D) in Eq. (12) is the same for all 341 actions, the utilities of different actions represented by thalamic activity are scaled by 342 the same constant. This means that the most active thalamic neurons are the ones 343 selective for the action with the highest utility, and hence this action may be chosen 344 through competition. Furthermore, if we assume that actions are only selected when 345 thalamic activity is above a threshold, then no action will be selected if all actions have 346 insufficient utility. The utility of actions has to be sufficiently high to increase neural 347 firing in the thalamus above the threshold and trigger action initiation.
348
Models of learning 349
In the previous section, we showed that the basal ganglia network can estimate the 350 utility once the striatal weights have acquired the appropriate values. In this section we 351 address the question of how these values are learned. Earlier, we proposed a general 352 framework for describing learning process assuming that the brain minimises a 353 prediction error during this process and we redefined the prediction error as the 354 difference between utility and expected utility. In the previous section we described a into Eq. (6) giving the following the state-dependent reward prediction error:
In this RPE, U is the utility of an action (Eq. (10) such prediction error has been used previously [42] . 365 We will now describe two models for learning the synaptic weights of G and N . The 366 first model is a normative model, developed for the purpose of this learning, while the 367 second model corresponds to a previously proposed model of striatal plasticity, and it 368 provides a more biologically realistic approximation of the first model.
369
Gradient model. The first model we use to describe learning of synaptic weights 370 under changing conditions, directly minimises the error in prediction of the utility of 371 action. It changes the weights proportionally to the gradient of the objective function: 372 ∆G = α∂F/∂G and ∆N = α∂F/∂N , respectively. For the prediction error described in Eq. (15) , this gives us the following learning rules for G and N :
Synaptic weights of Go and Nogo neurons are updated using the dopaminergic teaching 373 signal scaled by the learning rate constant α. The update rule for Go weights has an 374 additional term involving the dopaminergic activation signal encoding the motivation as 375 described in Eq. (13) . Only the update rule for G, but not for N , includes scaling by Payoff-cost model. The second model has been previously proposed to describe 379 how Go and Nogo neurons learn about payoffs and costs of actions. It has been shown 380 to account for a variety of data ranging from properties of dopaminergic receptors on 381 different striatal neurons to changes in risk preference when dopamine levels are low or 382 high [42] . We expected this model to provide an approximation for the gradient model 383 because it has been shown to be able to extract positive and negative consequences of 384 actions. More specifically, if reinforcement takes positive value r p half of the times and 385 negative value −r n the other half of times, then the Go weights converge to G = r p and 386 Nogo weights to N = r n , for certain parameters [43] . Therefore, we expected this 387 learning model to be able to extract positive and negative terms of the utility in Eq.
388
(10) if motivation could vary between trials, so the positive term dominates utility on 389 some trials while the negative term on other trials.
390
In our simulations we used the same update rules as previously described [42, 43] , 391 but we use a state-dependent prediction error (Eq. (15)) to account for decision making 392 under different physiological states.
where
The update rules in the above equations consist of two terms. The first term is the 394 change depending on the dopaminergic teaching signal scaled by a learning rate 395 constant α. It increases the weights of Go neurons when δ > 0, and slightly decreases 396 when δ < 0, so that changes in the Go weights mostly depend on positive prediction 397 errors. The constant controls the magnitude by which the weights are decreased. Nogo 398 weights will be updated in a analogous way, but these changes mostly depend on 399 negative prediction errors. The second term in the update rules is a decay term, scaled 400 by a decay rate constant λ. This term is necessary to ensure that the synaptic weights 401 stop growing when they are sufficiently high and allows weights to adapt more rapidly 402 when conditions change. In case an updated weight becomes negative, it is set to zero. 403
Simulations of learning 404
In this section, we investigate under what conditions the learning rules described above 405 can yield synaptic weights of Go and Nogo neurons that allow for the estimation of 406 utility. Recall that the network will correctly estimate the utility, if G = r and 407 N = r 2 /2.
408
In the simulations we make the following assumptions: 1) The simulated animal 409 knows its motivational level m, which influences both dopaminergic signals accordingly 410 (Eqs. (14) and (15)). 2) The simulated animal computes the utility of obtained 411 reinforcement as a change in the desirability of the physiological state. As described 412 above, the desirability depends on the objective value of the reinforcement r and the 413 current motivational state m according to Eq. (10), which was used to compute the 414 reward prediction error according to Eq. (15) . 415 We simulated scenarios in which the simulated animal repeatedly chooses a single 416 action and experiences a particular reinforcement r under different levels of motivation 417 m ∈ {m low , m baseline , m high }. Note that the m low = 0 correspond to a dopaminergic 418 activation signal of D = 0, m baseline = 1 gives a dopaminergic activation signal of 419 D = 0.5, which means that Go and Nogo neurons are equally weighted, and m high = 2 420 corresponds to a dopaminergic activation signal above baseline levels. 421 We first simulated a condition in which the motivation changed on each trial, and 422 took a randomly chosen value from a set {m low , m baseline , m high } ( Fig 5A) . The gradient 423 model was able to learn the desired values of Go and Nogo weights. In particular, Go 424 weights converged to r, while Nogo weights converged to r 2 /2, which allowed the 425 network to correctly estimate the utility. Although the subjective reinforcing value 426 changed as a function of physiological state, the model was able to learn the actual 427 reinforcement of an action. Encoding of such objective estimates allows the agent to 428 dynamically modulate behaviour based on metabolic reserves.
429
In contrast, the payoff-cost model converged to lower weights than desired. Although 430 it learned the synaptic weights based on the state-dependent prediction error, the 431 weight decay present in the model resulted in a lower asymptotic value.
432
To test robustness of the learning rules and because the motivational state is fixed 433 during the experimental paradigms simulated in this paper, we also simulated 434 conditions in which the motivation was kept constant (Fig 5B-D) . In these cases both 435 leaning rules converged to very similar values of synaptic weights: low levels of 436 motivation emphasised negative consequences and therefore facilitated Nogo learning 437 ( Fig 5B) , while high levels of motivation emphasised positive consequences and therefore 438 facilitated Go learning ( Fig 5D) . 439 In summary, the simulations indicate that for the models to learn appropriate values 440 of synaptic weights, the reinforcements need to be experienced under varying levels of 441 motivation. In this case, the gradient model provides a precise estimation, while the 442 payoff-cost model provides an approximation of the utility. In cases when the 443 motivational state is fixed during training, both models learn very similar values of the 444 weights.
445
The basal ganglia architecture allows for efficient learning 446 In the previous sections we presented and analysed models of how utilities can be 447 computed and learned in the basal ganglia network. One could ask, why would the 448 brain employ such complicated mechanisms if a simple model could give you the same 449 results? In particular, one could consider a standard Q-learning model, in which the 450 state is augmented by motivation. Such model would also be able to learn to estimate 451 the utility. However, such a model does not incorporate any prior knowledge about the 452 form of the utility function and its dependence on motivation. By contrast, the model 453 15)). Solid lines show simulations of the gradient model using the plasticity rules described in Eq. (16) and (17) . Dashed lines show simulations of the payoff-cost model using the plasticity rules described in Eq. (18) and (19) . Black lines correspond to Nogo neurons and grey lines to Go neurons. Each simulation had 150 trials and was repeated 100 times. All synaptic weights were initialised at zero. The parameters used in the simulations were α = 0.1, = 0.8 and λ = 0.01. These parameters allow the model to converge to positive and negative consequences at baseline motivational state [43] . grounded in basal ganglia architecture, assumes a particular form of the utility function 454 to be learned. In machine learning, such prior assumptions are known as 'inductive 455 bias', and they facilitate learning [45] . 456 We now illustrate that thanks to the correct inductive bias, the gradient model 457 learns to estimate the utility faster than standard Q-learning, which does not make any 458 prior assumptions about the form of the utility function. In our implementation of 459 Q-learning, the range of values the motivation can take was divided into a number of 460 bins, and the model estimated the utility for each bin. In the simulations on each trial 461 reinforcement r = 1 was received and its utility was computed using Eq. (10), which 462 relied on the current motivation. The Q-value for the current motivation bin was 463 updated by: ∆Q m = α(U − Q m ). In Fig. 6 we compare a Q-learning approach in which 464 the motivational state was discretised with the gradient model in our framework which 465 does not require discretisation of the motivational state. As can be seen in in Fig. 6,   466 both models are able to approximate the utility well. However, Q-learning takes 467 significantly more trials to do so. Moreover, the more bins are used for the 468 discretisation, the slower the learning occurs. to describe these dopaminergic responses and goal directed action selection in different 474 experimental paradigms. 475 We first show that the new, more complex and biological relevant learning rules can 476 also be used to explain the data by Cone et al. [25] . In these simulations, the 477 dopaminergic teaching signal at the time of the CS took on the value of the expected 478 utility (T / (1 − D) ) and at the time of the US represented the reward prediction error 479 described by (Eq. (15) ). Simulated values of the dopaminergic teaching signal (Fig 7) 480 show similar behaviour to the experimental data by Cone et al. [25] . Both the gradient 481 and the payoff-cost model produce a similar dopaminergic teaching signal. This could 482 be expected from simulations in the previous sections, which showed that both models 483 converge to similar weights if the motivation is kept constant during training.
484
Influence of physiological state on action selection 485 In the presented framework natural appetites, such as hunger or thirst can drive action 486 selection into the direction of the relevant reinforcement. Generally speaking, most 487 foods are considered appetitive even when an animal is in the near-optimal state.
488
Nevertheless, overconsumption could have negative consequence as you can experience 489 discomfort after eating too much. Therefore some of these negative consequences might 490 have to be accounted for as well. As discussed above, a good example of a natural 491 appetite that can be both appetitive and aversive dependent on the physiological state 492 of the animal is salt appetite. Salt is considered very aversive or appetitive when the 493 sodium physiology is balanced or depleted, respectively. Accordingly, rats reduce their 494 intake of sodium or salt-associated instrumental responding when balanced and vice 495 versa when depleted [26, 46] . This even occurs when animals have never experienced the 496 deprived state before and have not had the chance to relearn the incentive value of a 497 salt reinforcement under a high motivational state [46] . This example fits very well with 498 the incentive salience theory which states that the learned association can be 499 dynamically modulated by the physiological state of the animal. Modulation of 500 incentive salience adaptively guides motivated behaviour to appropriate reinforcements. 501 To demonstrate that the simple utility function (Eq. (10)) proposed in this paper (15) ) was used. The gradient model in grey uses the plasticity rules described in Eq. (16) and (17) . payoff-cost model is depicted in black and uses the plasticity rules described in Eq. (18) and (19) . Left and right panels show the data tested in the balanced state or depleted state, respectively. CS = conditioned stimulus, US = unconditioned stimulus, RPE = reward prediction error. Each simulation consisted of 50 trials and was repeated 5 times, similar to the number of animals in each group. The parameters used in the simulations were α = 0.1, = 0.8 and λ = 0.01.
action selection, we use the study by Berridge and Schulkin [26] . In this study, animals 504 learned the value of two different conditioned stimuli, one associated with salt intake 505 (CS+) and one with fructose intake (CS-). The animals were trained when they were in 506 a balanced state of sodium. Once the appropriate associations had been learned, the 507 animals were tested in a sodium balanced and sodium depleted state. As can be seen in 508 Fig 8A the intake of the CS+ was significantly increased in the sodium depleted state in 509 comparison to the balanced state and in comparison to the CS-intake. If we assume 510 that positive and negative consequences are encoded by the Go or Nogo pathway, 511 respectively, the synaptic weights of these pathways will acquire positive or negative 512 values depending on the situation. Again, the dopaminergic activation signal can 513 control to what extent these positive and negative consequences affect the basal ganglia 514 output as Go and Nogo neurons are modulated in an opposing manner.
515
Once the appropriate associations between the conditioned stimuli and the outcomes 516 are acquired, the outcomes can be dynamically modulated by the relevant state only 517 (i.e. the level of sodium depletion). The fact that the responses to the CS-are 518 unaffected by the physiological state of sodium suggests that salt and fructose are 519 modulated by separate appetitive systems and that the physiological state of the animal 520 modulates the intake proportional to the deprivational level of the animal. The 521 phenomenon that different reward types act on different appetitive system has been also 522 observed by other experimental studies [24] .
523
In our simulation, we assumed that the synaptic weights for Go and Nogo neurons 524 were learned in a near-balanced state of sodium since the animals had never experienced 525 a sodium depleted state before. During training, the motivation was low (m = 0.2), 526 resulting in low level of dopaminergic activation signal following Eq. (14) . During the 527 testing phase, the motivation for the CS+ was low (m = 0.2) for sodium in the 528 near-balanced state and high (m = 2) for the sodium depleted state. Given that 529 experimental data suggests that multiple appetitive systems may be involved we used [26] . A) Intake of fructose (CS-) or Sodium (CS+). B) Simulated data of number of actions made using the state-dependent prediction error (Eq. 15). The gradient model in grey uses the plasticity rules described in Eq. (16) and (17) . The payoff-cost model is depicted in black and uses the plasticity rules described in Eq. (18) and (19) . Within each graph, the left and right halves show the responses of animals tested in depleted and balanced states, respectively. CS+ = relevant conditioned stimulus for sodium, CS-= irrelevant conditioned stimulus for fructose. Within the graph, the left and right halves show the responses of animals tested in depleted and balanced states, respectively. CS+ = relevant conditioned stimulus for sodium, CS-= irrelevant conditioned stimulus for fructose. separate motivational signals for the CS+ and CS-. Therefore, the motivation for the 531 CS-were kept low (m = 0.1), but were non-negative, for both sodium near-balanced 532 and sodium depleted states since fructose has no effect on the physiological state of 533 sodium and we assumed that the animals were not deprived of other nutrients. The 534 thalamic activity was computed using Eq. (11), and additional Gaussian noise was 535 added to allow exploration. Actions were made when the thalamic activity was positive, 536 otherwise no action was made. The model received a reinforcement of r = 0.5 for each 537 action made and the utility was computed using Eq. (10). During training, Go and 538 Nogo weights were updated using the update equations presented above for the different 539 models. For the testing phase, the Go and Nogo values were kept constant based on the 540 learned values and were not allowed to be (re-)learned. Again, the thalamic activity was 541 computed and actions were taken when this was positive. Please note that the main 542 difference between near-balanced and depleted states, is the level of dopaminergic 543 activation signal. As can be seen in Fig 8B both 
State-dependent valuation 547
There is a number of experimental studies that have investigated the influence of 548 physiological state at the time of learning on the preference during subsequent 549 encounters (e.g. [27, 34, 35, 47] ). In the study by Aw et al. [27] , animals were trained in 550 both a near-balanced and deprived state. One action was associated with food in the 551 near-balanced state and another action was associated with food in the deprived state. 552 Animals were tested in both states. In both cases, animals preferred the action associated with the deprived state during learning and the proportions of trials with 554 these actions are above chance level ( Fig 9A) . These results resemble the data on 555 dopaminergic responses (Fig 1) , which also demonstrated higher response to 556 reward-predicting stimuli (CS) that had been experienced in a depleted state. In this 557 section we show that such preferences can be produced by the proposed models. 558 Fig 9. Simulation of a study by Aw et al. [27] . A) Experimental data by Aw et al. [27] . B) Simulated data using the state-dependent prediction error (Eq. 15). gradient model in grey uses the plasticty rules described in Eq. (16) and (17) . payoff-cost model is depicted in black and uses the plasticity rules described in Eq. (18) and (19) . Hungry and Prefed refer to the physiological state at testing. The parameters used in the simulations were α = 0.1, = 0.8 and λ = 0.01. Additionally a Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.1 was added to the above thalamic activity.
We simulated learning of the synaptic weights of Go and Nogo neurons when the 559 motivation was high (i.e. hungry) and when the motivation was low (i.e. prefed). In the 560 experiment by Aw and colleagues, the training phase consisted of forced choice trials in 561 which the reinforcement was only available in one arm of a Y-maze while the other arm 562 is blocked. For example, the left arm was associated with a food reinforcement during 563 hunger and the right arm was associated with a food reinforcement during the prefed 564 condition. In the experiment, 11 animals were used, which were trained for 65 trials on 565 average to reach the required performance. In line with this, our simulations were 566 repeated 11 times, and in each iteration we trained the model for varying trial numbers 567 with a mean of 65. Motivation was set to m = 2 for hungry and m = 0.2 for prefed. The 568 dopaminergic activation signal was fixed to values that correspond to the motivation 569 described by Eq. (14) . For each correct action, the model received a reinforcement of 570 r = 0.2 and the utility was calculated using the utility in Eq. (10) . At the start of each 571 simulated forced trial, the model computed the thalamic activity (using Eq. (11)) of the 572 available action and some independent noise was added. The thalamic activity for the 573 unavailable action was zero. The action with the highest positive thalamic activity was 574 chosen. If the thalamic activity of all action was negative, no actions was made and the 575 reinforcement was zero. Each time an action was made the synaptic weights of Go and 576 Nogo neurons were updated using the state-dependent reward prediction error and the 577 update rules described in section Models of learning. The learning rate for all of these 578 models was set to α = 0.1. Once learning was completed, the synaptic weights were 579 fixed and were not allowed to be updated anymore.
580
During the testing phase, both arms were available and the animals could freely 581 choose an arm to obtain a reinforcement in. All 11 animals were tested for 24 trials.
582
Our simulations were tested for 24 trials for both conditions and repeated 11 times 583 using the individual learned Go and Nogo weights for the prefed and hungry condition. 584 Again, the model computed the thalamic activity for both options simultaneously (in 585 parallel) plus some independent noise. The action with the highest thalamic activity 586 was chosen. The proportion of actions associated with the hungry option are depicted in 587 Fig 9B. This experiment was simulated for both physiological states during testing 588 phase. The proportion of actions for the arm associated with hunger were calculated for 589 both states. Both the experimental and simulated data show that the animals chose the 590 action associated with the hungry state more often, regardless of the current state.
591
To gain some intuition for why the models preferred the option that was associated 592 with hungry state during training, let us look back at the simulations presented in 
Discussion
602
In this paper, we have presented a novel framework for action selection under 603 motivational control of internal physiological factors. The framework is biologically 604 grounded and brings together models of direct and indirect pathways of the basal 605 ganglia with the incentive learning theory. We proposed two models that learn about 606 positive and negative aspects of actions utilising a prediction error that is influenced by 607 the current physiological state. In this section, we will discuss the experimental 608 predictions, the relationship to experimental data and other computational models and 609 other implications.
610
Experimental predictions 611
In this section, we outline the predictions the models make. The neural implementation 612 of the framework assumes that Nogo neurons prevent selecting actions with large 613 reinforcements when the motivation is low. Thus it predicts that pharmacological 614 manipulations of striatal Nogo neurons through D2 agonist (or antagonist) should 615 increase (or decrease) the animal's tendency to consume large portions of food or other 616 reinforcers to a larger extent when it is close to satiation, than when it is deprived.
617
The neural implementation of the framework also assumes that the activity in Go 618 and Nogo pathways is modulated by the dopaminergic activation signal, which depends 619 on motivation. This assumption could be tested by recording activity of Go and Nogo 620 neurons, for example using photometry, while an animal decides whether to consume a 621 reinforcement. The framework predicts that deprivation should scale up responses of Go 622 neurons, and scale down the response of Nogo neurons.
623
As showed in Fig. 5A , the framework predicts that the synaptic weights of Go and 624 Nogo neurons converge to different values depending on the reinforcement magnitude. 625 These predictions can be tested in an experiment equivalent to the simulation in Fig. 
626
5A in which mice learn that different cues predict different reinforcement sizes, and The proposed framework can account for decision making and learning as a function of 635 physiological state, as shown by the simulations of the data by Cone et al., Berridge and 636 Schulkin and Aw et al. More specifically, we proposed that learning occurs based on the 637 difference between the utility and expected utility of an action. This is in line with 638 results from a study in monkeys that also suggested that dopaminergic responses 639 reflects a difference in utility of obtained reward and expected utility [30] . That study 640 focused on a complementary aspect of subjective valuation of reward, namely that the 641 utility of different volumes of reward is not equal to the objective volume, but rather to 642 its nonlinear function. In this paper we additionally point out that the utility of 643 rewards depends on the physiological state in which they are received. dopamine emphasise positive consequences [3, 5, 48] . In our simulations, we observe this 647 as well: a low dopaminergic activation signal emphasises the negative consequences of activation signal emphasises the positive consequences of actions encoded in the 650 synaptic weights of Go neurons. However, there are a couple considerations that have to 651 be made with respect to the dopaminergic signal in our simulations. First, we assume 652 that striatal neurons can read out both motivational and teaching signals encoded by 653 dopaminergic neurons [21] . In our theory, we describe two roles of dopamine neurons, 654 namely activation and teaching signal, however, we do not provide a solution to how 655 these different signals are accessed. The function of dopamine neurons has been under a 656 current debate and its complexity is not well understood [22] . We will leave the details 657 of the mechanisms by which they can be distinguished to future work. We assume that 658 the models, particularly the gradient model, has access to multiple dopaminergic signals 659 simultaneously. Although we recognise that this is a simplified concept of what might 660 be happening in the brain, it still provides us with new insights in how these different 661 functions affect aspects of decision making. Further research is necessary to describe the 662 complexity of dopamine neurons in decision making. 663 Secondly, in this paper we have focused primarily on one dimension, namely nutrient 664 deprivation. However, experimental data suggests that reinforcements are scaled 665 selectively by their physiological needs [24] . A nutrient specific deprivation alters 666 goal-directed behaviour towards the relevant reinforcement, but not the irrelevant one. 667 In contrast, other physiological factors, such as fatigue, may scale only the negative, but 668 not the positive consequences. This hypothesis is supported by data showing that 669 muscular fatigue alters dopamine levels [49] . Together this suggests that the utility of 670 an action is most likely the sum of all the positive and negative consequences with 671 respect to their physiological needs or other external factors. Therefore, extending the 672 current theory to multiple dimensions is an important direction of future work. In such 673 an extended model, an action which changes the state of multiple physiological D2 receptors are activated to a lesser extent. The involvement of the DA system in 702 reward and reinforcement suggests that low engagement of Nogo neurons in obese 703 subjects predisposes them to excessive use of food.
704
Relationship to other computational models 705 The proposed framework builds on or is related with several other theories. For 706 example, Keramati and Gutkin [28] developed a theory that also extended the 707 reinforcement learning theory to incorporate physiological state. They defined a 708 'homeostatic space' as a multidimensional metric space in which each dimension 709 represents physiologically-regulated variable. At each time point the physiological state 710 of an animal can be represented as a point in this space. They also define motivation 711 (to which they refer to as 'drive') as the distance between the current internal state and 712 the desired setpoint. We extended this theory to include how the brain computes the 713 modulation of learned values by physiology.
714
In the motivation for the existence of the desired physiological state, Keramati and 715 Gutkin [28] referred to active inference theory [54] . Our framework also shares a 716 conceptual similarity with this theory, in that both action selection and learning can be 717 viewed as the minimisation of surprise. To make this link clearer, let us provide a 718 probabilistic interpretation for action selection and learning processes in our framework. 719 This interpretation is inspired by a model of homeostatic control [55] . It assumes that 720 the animal has a prior expectation P (S) of what the physiological state S should be, 721 which is encoded by a normal distribution with mean equal to the desired state S * .
722
That model assumes that animals have an estimate of their current bodily state S 723 (interoception). It proposes that animals avoid states S that are unlikely according to 724 the prior distribution with mean S * (thus they minimise their "interoceptive surprise"), 725 and they wish to find themselves in the states S with high prior probability P (S).
726
Following these assumptions, we can define the desirability of the state as 727 Y (S) = ln P (S). If we assume for simplicity that P (S) has unit variance and ignore an 728 additive constant, we obtain our definition of a desirability of a state in Eq. (2). In our 729 framework, actions are chosen to minimise the surprise of ending up in a new 730 physiological state. The closer this state is to the desired state the more likely it will be 731 and the smaller the surprise. Furthermore, motivation itself could be viewed as an error 732 in the prediction of the physiological state.
733
Similar to action selection, animals update the parameters of their internal model 734 (e.g. V , G, N ) during learning in order to be less surprised by the outcome of the chosen 735 action. To describe this more formally, let us assume that the animal expects the utility 736 to be normally distributed with meanÛ and variance 1 (for simplicity). Furthermore, 737 assume that during learning the animal minimises the surprise about the observed 738 utility of action U . Therefore, we can define the negative of this surprise as F = ln P (U ). 739 This objective function is equal (ignoring a constants) to our objective function defined 740 in Eq. (8) . Thus in summary, similar to the active inference framework, both action 741 selection and learning could be viewed as processes of minimising prediction errors.
742
The dopaminergic activation signal is often associated with an increase in the vigour 743 of actions [10] . In the study by Niv et al. [10] same assumption is held that the utility of 744 the reinforcement is dependent on the deprivational level, however, they do not provide 745 a mechanism for how these utilities are computed and are therefore set them arbitrarily. 746 Moreover, they rely on average reward reinforcement learning techniques which reveal 747 an optimal policy that leads to an average reward rate per time unit. Following this line 748 of thinking, actions with higher utility (i.e. actions taken in a deprived state) cause 749 higher response rates as the opportunity cost of time increases. Although our model 750 does not describe vigour or response times, it could be related to these output statistics 751 thanks to recent work investigating the relationship between activity of a basal ganglia 752 and describes action selection and learning in a state-dependent manner. 
